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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

IN THE PROSECUTOR WE TRUST? A CASE AGAINST
PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL
CONDUCT INTO THE SENTENCING PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIALS

I. INTRODUCTION
Netherland, 1

In Gray v.
Coleman Wayne Gray and Melvin Tucker
followed Richard McClelland, 2 the store manager of Murphy’s Mart in
Portsmouth, Virginia, with the intent to rob him and the store. 3 While high on
cocaine the pair forced McClelland into their car and subsequently took
$13,000 from Murphy’s Mart. 4 They then drove McClelland to a remote area
and shot 5 him six times in the back of the head with a .32-caliber weapon. 6
The bodies of Lisa Sorrell and her three-year-old daughter Shanta were
found in Sorrell’s burned car in Chesapeake, Virginia, approximately five
months before Gray was charged with the capital murder of McClelland. 7
Sorrell had been shot in the head six times with a .32-caliber weapon. 8 Gray
was never charged with the Sorrell murders. 9
In the sentencing phase of Gray’s capital trial, the prosecution put Melvin
Tucker, who was testifying against Gray in exchange for a lesser sentence, on
the stand to testify that Gray told him “he had ‘knocked off’ Lisa Sorrell.” 10
Gray denied any involvement in the Sorrell murders. 11 The only direct
connection between Gray and the Sorrell murders was Tucker’s statement. 12
In closing argument, however, the prosecution discussed the similarities
between the two murders and argued that he should be sentenced to death for
the threat of future violence. 13 After being exposed to gruesome, detailed

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

518 U.S. 152 (1996).
McClelland had also recently fired Gray’s wife. Id. at 155-156.
Id.
Id.
Gray claimed that Tucker was the person who pulled the trigger. Id.
Id.
Gray, 518 U.S. at 155-156.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 176-177
Gray, 518 U.S. 176-177.
157
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evidence about the murders of Sorrell and her baby daughter, the jury
sentenced Gray to death. 14
The problem, as Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissenting opinion, was that
there was much evidence linking Lisa Sorrell’s husband, Timothy Sorrell, to
the murders. 15 In fact, the police’s number one suspect had been Timothy
Sorrell throughout its investigation. 16 Lisa Sorrell felt discontent about
Timothy Sorrell’s involvement in the sale of stolen goods. 17 Timothy, in
speaking to his friends at a party the night before the murders, revealed that he
had a .32 caliber weapon. 18 Timothy also made several statements to friends
about his desire for his wife to be killed. 19 Additionally, the family
suspiciously purchased a life insurance policy for Lisa two weeks before the
murders in which Timothy and baby Shanta were named as the beneficiaries. 20
Gray’s defense counsel was not given enough time to discover this
information, thus the jury never heard any of this evidence. 21
Melvin Tucker remains in prison for the McClelland murder. 22 Since his
part in the sentencing phase of Gray’s trial, Tucker has admitted that “his
testimony about Gray’s admission that he killed the two women was false.” 23
On Wednesday February 26, 1997 at 8.55 p.m., “Gray walked trembling
into Virginia’s execution chamber . . . and was strapped to the gurney [sic] by
guards. Once injected, he lifted his head, looked from left to right and began
breathing heavily. He made no last statement.” 24 Gray stopped breathing at
9:04 p.m. 25
Many states allow evidence of unadjudicated conduct in the sentencing
phase of capital trials. “[B]ecause there is no level of proof which must be
established, there is no way to know whether the alleged conduct even
occurred.” 26 The objective of this article is to show the many fallacies with
allowing unadjudicated criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of capital
trials. As long as the United States continues to allow capital punishment, it
should do everything in its power to assure that its implementation is as fair
and impartial as possible. For this reason, the Supreme Court should rule
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gray, 518 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Stay of Execution Denied for Coleman Gray, T HE VIRGINIAN-PILOT , Feb. 22, 1977, at

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 65-66 (1999).

B3.
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against allowing unadjudicated criminal conduct into the sentencing phase of
capital trials and finally unify the states on this issue. Even if the Supreme
Court does not decide on such a case, the Missouri Supreme Court should
decide not to allow this evidence into the sentencing phase of capital trials.
This note will present five arguments for why Missouri should overturn
State v. Christeson, 27 the Missouri precedent stating that evidence of
unadjudicated conduct is allowed into evidence in capital sentencing. The first
section will describe domestic and international views on sentencing
procedures in capital trials and demonstrate the importance of using
international opinions as a guide to United States’ opinions. The second
argument will contend that Apprendi v. New Jersey 28 bars States from allowing
unadjudicated conduct into the sentencing phase without proving that conduct
beyond a reasonable doubt. The third argument will discuss why evidentiary
sentencing standards should ban the prosecution from entering unadjudicated
conduct into evidence. The fourth argument will discuss procedural due
process in civil cases and how it relates to the criminal cases. This note will
next address the current motive that some states, like Missouri, have for
permitting the use of evidence of unadjudicated conduct in capital sentencing
and then question the soundness of that motive. Finally, the conclusion will
come back to the above-mentioned case of Gray v. Netherland and suggest that
had unadjudicated evidence of criminal conduct been kept out of the
sentencing phase, there likely would have been a different result.
II. INTRODUCTION TO SENTENCING P ROCEDURES

IN CAPITAL

T RIALS

At the outset, it is important to be familiar with the general procedural
format of capital trials. First, the defendant must be notified that the
government seeks the death penalty, and aggravating factors must be presented
to show a justification for the death sentence. 29 Subsequently, in the guilt
phase of a capital trial, the jury determines whether the defendant is guilty of
the capital offense. 30 If the defendant is convicted, he is provided a separate
hearing to determine punishment, known as the sentencing phase. 31
States must “limit the class of murderers to which the death penalty may be
applied,” per Furman v. Georgia. 32 For this reason, most states have come up
with a list of aggravating circumstances and the jury must find at least one for
the death penalty to be imposed. 33 The Furman requirement is “usually met
27. 131 S.W.3d 796.
28. 530 U.S. 584 (2000).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 848(h)(1)(B) (2006)
30. 21 U.S.C. §848(i); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591(a)-3593(b) (2006).
31. 21 U.S.C. §848(i); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2006).
32. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972).
33. Even this restriction is becoming meaningless, however. “[S]ome of the added factors
are so general—such as if the murder is “cold, calculated and premeditated”—as to throw the
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when the trier of fact finds at least one statutory eligibility factor at either the
guilt phase or penalty phase.” 34 The trier of fact must then decide whether the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty. 35
Capital punishment trials occur in two phases. 36 During the first phase, the
jury deliberates on whether the prosecution has proved at least one aggravating
factor 37 beyond a reasonable doubt and must come to that conclusion
unanimously. 38 If the jury does not unanimously find the prosecution upheld
its burden of proving an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the
death penalty cannot be imposed. 39
Once the jury has found an aggravating factor does exist, it continues to
stage two. Here, they must determine if the aggravating factors sufficiently
outweigh the mitigating factors, or if the aggravating factors are adequate to
validate a death sentence. 40 Mitigating factors only have to be determined by a
preponderance of the evidence standard. 41 Finally, “the jury by unanimous
vote . . . shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced to death,
to life imprisonment without the possibility of release, or some other lesser
sentence.” 42
Section 565.030.4 of the Revised Missouri Statutes 43 establishes a four
step test in order for a defendant to receive the death penalty. 44
Step 1 requires the trier of fact to find the presence of one or more statutory
aggravating factors set out in section 565.032.2. Step 2 requires the trier of
fact (whether jury or judge) to find that the evidence in aggravation of
punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the statutory
aggravating factors, warrants imposition of the death penalty. In step 3 the jury
is required to determine whether the evidence in mitigation outweighs the
evidence in aggravation found in steps 1 and 2. If it does, the defendant is not
class of eligible cases wide open. And that, in turn, invites with a neon sign the kind of
arbitrariness that the original list of aggravating factors was intended to surmount. Today, one
prosecutor’s death penalty case is another’s life sentence.” Editorial, Fixing the Death Penalty,
CHI. T RIB., Dec. 29, 2000, at A1
34. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 887 (2006).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. “Aggravating circumstance” or “aggravating factor” is frequently used “to refer to those
statutory factors which determine death eligibility in satisfaction of Furman’s narrowing
requirement.” Id. at 889.
38. Id. at 887; see also 21 U.S.C. § 848(k); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 848(k); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d).
40. Brown, 126 S.Ct. at 887; see also 21 U.S.C. §848(k). Some states have statutes that say
if the mitigating factors equal the aggravating factors, then the death penalty should be imposed.
Many states, however, are invalidating those statutes. State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445 (Kan. 2004).
41. 21 U.S.C. §§848(j)-(k); see also 18 U.S.C. §§3593(c)-(d).
42. 21 U.S.C. §848(k); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).
43. MO. REV. STAT . § 565.030.4 (2006).
44. State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 261 (Mo. 2003).
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eligible for death, and the jury must return a sentence of life imprisonment.
Finally, in step 4 of section 565.030.4, the trier of fact is instructed that it must
assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment if it decides under all
of the circumstances not to assess and declare the punishment at death. 45

In Missouri, a jury can give a life sentence notwithstanding “the weight it gave
to aggravators and mitigators it found.” 46
As a result of the procedural system for sentencing in capital trials, a
capital defendant has to “investigate and present a complete and effective case
in mitigation while rebutting either or both aggravating circumstances of
vileness and future dangerousness.” 47 Because the State may present evidence
of unadjudicated criminal conduct to prove future dangerousness, “the capital
defendant might have the difficult task of refuting acts that no one ever proved
he committed.” 48
III. STATE OPINIONS VS. INTERNATIONAL OPINIONS ON UNADJUDICATED
CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE SENTENCING P HASE OF CAPITAL T RIALS
A. Differing State Decisions in the United States
The Supreme Court leaves many decisions up to State courts and
legislatures. There are some decisions that the Supreme Court directly states
should be left up to the states. Other decisions, however, are left for states to
decide by default. 49 For this reason, it is important, on issues that the Supreme
Court has not decided, to look to state’s decisions throughout the country.
The issue of unadjudicated criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of
capital trials has not gone before the Supreme Court. Therefore, by default, the
states are left to formulate their own opinions. In the United States, there are
eight states 50 that do not allow evidence of unadjudicated offenses at the
sentencing phase of capital trials. 51 There are ten states 52 that allow the
evidence to come in, but impose “strict procedural protections such as a

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in Aggravation,
17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 322 (2005).
48. Id.
49. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively.” U.S. CONST . amend. IX, § 2.
50. Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Washington.
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 52/01, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/52-01.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter
IACHR].
51. Id.
52. Arkansas, California, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, South
Carolina and Utah. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

162

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:157

heightened standard of reliability.” 53 It also must be taken into consideration
that twelve states ban the death penalty all together, thus do not need to decide
the issue. 54
Courts give different reasons for not allowing evidence of unadjudicated
criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of capital trials. For example, the
Supreme Court of Washington found the following:
To allow the jury which has convicted defendant of aggravated first degree
murder to consider evidence of other crimes of which defendant has not been
convicted is, in our opinion, unreasonably prejudicial to defendant. A jury
which has convicted defendant of a capital crime is unlikely fairly and
impartially to weigh evidence of prior alleged offenses. In effect, to allow
such evidence is to impose upon a defendant who stands in peril of his life the
burden of defending, before the jury that has already convicted him, new
charges of criminal activity. Information relating to defendant’s criminal past
should therefore be limited to his record of convictions. 55

Additionally, in Alabama it was found that “[u]ntil the State proves him
guilty of this charge in accordance with appropriate legal procedures [the
defendant] is presumed innocent . . . [t]his fundamental tenet of our system of
justice prohibits use against an individual of unproven charges in this life or
death situation.” 56
Some courts, however, side with Missouri, and allow such evidence into
the penalty phase. In Virginia it was found that there was no “due process
requirement that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant engaged in the unadjudicated criminal conduct offered as evidence
in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial.” 57 Furthermore, the Court
looked to Patterson v. New York, 58 stating that “the state need not prove

53. Id.
54. These states are Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
55. State v. Bartholomew, 654 P.2d 1170, 1184 (Wash. 1982).
56. Cook v. State, 369 So.2d 1251, 1257 (Ala. 1979).
57. Walker v. Com., 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (Va. 1999). There is also an interesting
incongruity in Virginia:
at sentencing for non-capital felonies, unadjudicated criminal conduct is inadmissible.
However, adjudicated criminal conduct is admissible to prove, to some extent, future
dangerousness. Nevertheless, in capital cases, where the punishment is final and more
severe, evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is admissible. If the Virginia
legislature and courts are unable to see any “relationship” between unadjudicated conduct
and the appropriate sentence in non-capital cases, it is difficult to understand how the
legislature and courts can see such a relationship in capital cases where the potential
punishment is infinitely more severe and final.
Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 65-66 (1999).
58. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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beyond a reasonable doubt every fact it recognizes as a circumstance affecting
the severity of punishment.” 59
B. Missouri’s Decision to Permit Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct in the
Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials
In Missouri there is no “future dangerousness” statutory aggravator,
therefore evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is considered a “nonstatutory aggravator” and is used primarily for increasing the weight of the
prosecution’s argument. 60 The rule permitting unadjudicated criminal conduct
to be heard in the sentencing phase of capital trials in the state of Missouri was
determined in the case of State v. Christeson:
Evidence of a defendant’s prior unadjudicated criminal conduct is admissible
during the penalty phase. During the penalty phase, both the state and the
defense may introduce any evidence pertaining to the defendant’s character,
including evidence of the defendant’s conduct that occurred subsequent to the
crime being adjudicated. 61

In State v. Christeson, the trial court allowed the jury to hear evidence that
the defendant sodomized a person in order to show a “predatory pattern.” 62
This evidence did not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and was
allowed in to contradict the mitigating evidence the defense presented. 63
C. International Opinion
1. The Importance of International Opinion in General
Since the creation of the Unites States Constitution, Supreme Court
Justices have looked to international opinion in deciding cases. 64 Most
recently, Justice Kennedy has taken up the practice of citing international
opinion, causing international opinion to be more focal than ever before. 65

59. Walker v. Com., 515 S.E.2d 565, 572 (Va. 1999) (citing Patterson, 432 U.S. at 214).
60. The Missouri homicide statute contains the following statutory aggravator: “The offense
was committed by a person. . . who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions.”
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.032(2)(1) (2006). Unadjudicated conduct and future dangerousness,
however, are not statutory aggravators in Missouri.
61. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 269 (Mo. 2001).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could
Change the Supreme Court, T HE NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050912fa_fact (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
65. “Had the practice of citing foreign sources been confined to liberal—and, in the current
political arrangement of the Court, less influential—Justices, it would have remained a
phenomenon primarily of academic interest. . .’When Kennedy, who’s hardly a liberal, started
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International judges face analogous problems to those of the United States,
therefore it is useful to look to foreign opinions. 66 Furthermore, foreign judges
are “dealing with texts that more and more protect basic human rights,” and if
foreign problems are comparable to those of the United States, why not read
what the foreign judges are deciding, even if only for educational purposes. 67
Finally, in an argument best stated by Justice Kennedy, “[i]f we are asking the
rest of the world to adopt our idea of freedom, it does seem to me that there
may be some mutuality there, that other nations and other peoples can define
and interpret freedom in a way that’s at least instructive to us.” 68
2. Trend towards Following International Opinion in Capital Punishment
Cases
International opinion should be specifically applied to capital punishment
cases. In his recent article, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the
U.S., Richard Dieter illustrates why international opinion should and is starting
to have an effect on capital punishment decisions in the United States. 69 First,
recently in the United States there has been an acknowledgement of the “need
for international cooperation and respect for the laws of other democracies.” 70
Dieter also states that “there is a broader intersection between United States
capital punishment law and the interests of other countries.” 71 Finally,
international opinion has changed so that instead of an assortment of views on
capital punishment among United States allies, there is now a “growing
consensus condemning its use in general.” 72
An example of the United States using international opinion in a capital
punishment case is in Atkins v. Virginia, 73 where the Supreme Court held that
the execution of persons with mental retardation constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 74 The opinion mentioned an amicus curiae brief by the European
citing these international sources, that’s when the subject exploded in the broader political world,’
says Dorsen, who in 2003 founded the International Journal of Constitutional Law.” Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. This was said at a debate at American University in Response to Scalia’s statement
that international opinion is immaterial because “we don’t have the same moral and legal
framework as the rest of the world, and never have.” Id.
68. Id.
69. Richard C. Dieter, International Influence on the Death Penalty in the U.S., FOREIGN
SERVICE J., Oct. 2003, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=
17&did=806 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
70. Id.
71. Id. Dieter cites as examples “[i]ssues of extradition, the execution of foreign nationals,
and the prospects of military tribunals to deal with suspected foreign terrorists often put the death
penalty and international human rights concerns in direct conflict.” Id.
72. Id.
73. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
74. Id. at 321.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

IN THE PROSECUTOR WE TRUST?

165

Union that banned executions of persons with mental retardation. 75 “The clear
inference of this reference was that international opinion played a role in
determining the standards of decency as they evolved in a maturing society.” 76
Even though only eighteen states banned executions of persons with mental
retardation, “the Court found evidence of a consensus when these states were
joined with many other factors, including world opinion.” 77
Most recently, the Supreme Court cited international opinion in Roper v.
Simmons 78 when it found the death penalty to be unconstitutional for
juveniles. 79 The majority opinion stated that:
[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international
opinion against the juvenile death penalty. . . [i]t does not lessen our fidelity to
the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of
freedom. 80

The United States should follow its opinions in Atkins v. Virginia and
Roper v. Simmons and cite to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) decision, see infra, ruling that evidence of unadjudicated
criminal conduct should not be allowed into the sentencing phase of capital
trials. 81 In the United States, eighteen states limit the use of this evidence, in
addition to the twelve states that ban the death penalty all together. 82 When
taken into consideration with world opinion, it is clear that the “evolving
standards” in society 83 support the disuse of this evidence.
Even if the United States opts not to take on the issue of evidence of
unadjudicated conduct in the sentencing phase of capital trials, Missouri should
recognize that its abolition by fellow states and international opinion indicates
a need for its reevaluation. As the Supreme Court is concerned with more
pressing and complicated issues, Missouri should not look at the lack of
adjudication of the issue as the Court being in agreement with Missouri’s
75. Id. at 316, n.21.
76. See Dieter, supra note 69.
77. Id.
78. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
79. Id. at 575.
80. Id. at 578.
81. See IACHR, supra note 49.
82. Id.
83. In an speech given to his students in Europe, indicating the importance of society, Justice
Kennedy stated “Here you are in Europe. . .[a]nd you might think, Gee, look at this culture, look
at these churches, look how old everything is. But you have the oldest constitution in the world.
We have a legal identity, and our self-definition as a nation is bound up with the
Constitution. . .[t]here is also the constitution with a small ‘c,’ the sum total of customs and mores
of the community. . . [t]he closer the big ‘C’ and the small ‘c,’ the better off you are as a society. ”
See Toobin, supra note 59.
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approach. Therefore, Missouri should follow the same logic as the Atki ns and
Roper decisions, and look to world opinion as evidence of the need to overturn
State v. Christeson.
3. International Structures in Place for the Protection of Human Rights
and for the Facilitation of Implementing International Views
i.

The IACHR and Its Function

The IACHR is a body in the inter-American structure for the “promotion
and protection of human rights.” 84 It is an independent branch of the
Organization of American States (OAS). 85 The IACHR’s “mandate is found in
the OAS Charter and the American Convention of Human Rights.” 86 The
IACHR speaks for each of the member States 87 of the OAS. 88 Seven members
of the IACHR act independently, without speaking for any individual
country. 89 “The members of the IACHR are elected by the General Assembly
of the OAS.” 90 The IACHR is a “permanent body which meets in ordinary and
special sessions several times a year.” 91 The principal function of the IACHR
is to endorse the “observance and defense of human rights.” 92
Additionally, the IACHR’s decisions are only recommendations, and are
not legally binding in the United States. 93 While the decisions are not binding,
the petitioners and the states often come to an agreement. 94 The following
chart shows the “total number of friendly settlement reports published”:

84. About the OAS, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=../../documents/
eng/memberstates.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
85. Also, the OAS “brings together the countries of the Western Hemisphere to strengthen
cooperation and advance common interests. It is the region’s premier forum for multilateral
dialogue and concerted action.” Id. The OAS takes on such tasks as defending democracy,
protecting human rights, strengthening security, fostering free trade, combating illegal drugs, and
fighting corruption. Id.
86. Id.
87. The membering states of OAS are: Antiqua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadinas, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, United States of America, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. Id.
88. IACHR, available at http://www.cidh.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See IACHR, supra note 88.
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ii. The Role of the American Declaration and Its Interplay with the
IACHR
“The American Declaration is an international human rights instrument
that contains fair trial guarantees.” 96 The IACHR “has the authority 97 to
entertain individual petitions alleging that OAS member states, including the
United States, have failed to comply with their obligations under the American
Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man.” 98
While the American Declaration was not implemented as a legally binding
treaty, the OAS Charter, of which the United States is a part, is legally
binding. 99 The IACHR has determined “that the American Declaration
‘acquired binding force’ by means of the amendments to the OAS Charter
adopted in 1967-68.” 100

95. Id.
96. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX (May 2, 1948),
available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
97. Id.
98. Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Gen. Ass. Res. 447,
9th Sess., art. 20, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic15.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
99. IACHR, Resolution 3/87, Roach & Pinkerton v. United States, ¶¶ 46-49, reprinted in
Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 294-96 (1987).
100. Id.
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iii. United States v. Garza, a Case Submitted to the IACHR Concerning
Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct in the Sentencing Phase of Capital
Trials
In United States v. Garza, Juan Raul Garza headed a drug trafficking
enterprise. 101 After setbacks from an intermittent seizure by law enforcement,
Garza became suspicious of some of his workers tipping him off to the police,
and had one victim killed as a forewarning to De La Fuente, the victim’s
associate. 102 He later had De La Fuente and a third associate that cooperated
with authorities killed. 103 “In February 1992, the U.S. Customs Service
mounted a sweeping interstate offensive” and “[a]s a result of this raid, most of
Garza’s associates were indicted and arrested.” 104 Garza fled to Mexico and
was later caught by police after trying to make a drug deal with an associate
that was working with the authorities. 105 Garza, who was one of two
defendants, was convicted of two counts of killing in furtherance of the first
defendant’s, Flores, continuing criminal enterprise, as well as the other drug
offenses. 106
In the sentencing phase, the jury concluded that Garza was responsible for
five further killings, and that Garza was a continual threat to others. 107 The
jury then “unanimously found that the aggravators sufficiently outweighed the
mitigators to justify a sentence of death.” 108 He was sentenced to death by the
federal court in Texas for the three murders. 109 Garza next filed a petition with
the IACHR, stating the evidence of unadjudicated murders in the sentencing
phase violated his rights. 110
iv. The IACHR Report in United States v. Garza
Garza asserted in his petition to the IACHR that the United States violated
1) his right to a fair trial under Article XXVIII of the American Declaration
and 2) his right to due process of law under Article XXVI of the American
Declaration. 111 Article XVIII of the American Declaration states that “[e]very
person may resort to the courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. . . [t]here
should likewise be available to him a simple, brief procedure whereby the
101.
102.
103.
1352.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

United States v. Garza, 63 F.3d 1342, 1351 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id.
Id. Garza paid $10,000 to each person who helped in the killing of De La Fuente. Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Garza, 63 F.3d at 1367.
Id.
Id.
See IACHR, supra note 46.
Id.
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courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any
fundamental constitutional rights.” 112 Article XXVI 113 states that “[e]very
person accused of an offense has the right to be given an impartial and public
hearing, and to be tried by courts previously established in accordance with
preexisting laws.” 114
The IACHR found that the United States violated Articles XVIII and
XXVI of the American Declaration, in accordance with Garza’s claim. 115 In
its opinion, the IACHR recommended 116 the United States look at “its laws,
procedures, and practices to ensure that persons who are accused of capital
crimes are tried and sentenced in accordance with the rights under the
American Declaration, including in particular prohibiting the introduction of
evidence of unadjudicated crimes during the sentencing phase of capital
trials.” 117
C. Conclusion
Clearly, the IACHR disapproves of using unadjudicated prior bad acts
during the sentencing phase of capital trials. 118 Its recommendation in Uni ted
States vs. Garza should influence the United States in the sentencing procedure
domain.
Additionally, Missouri should view the IACHR report and
accordingly review its procedure of allowing unadjudicated criminal conduct
during the sentencing phase of capital trials, and in doing so will hopefully be
influenced to follow the lead of states like Washington and Alabama.

112. American Declaration Article XVIII, available at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/
basic2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
113. Compare with the U.S. Constitution which states that “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” U.S. CONST . amend. VI., § 2.
114. See IACHR, supra note 49.
115. Id.
116. Can only recommend because its decisions are not binding on the United States.
117. See IACHR, supra note 49.
118. Id.
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IV. APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY AND RING V. ARIZONA P ROHIBIT THE USE OF
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE SENTENCING P HASE OF CAPITAL
T RIALS
A. Decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona
In New Jersey, the crime of possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose is a second-degree offense. 119 The punishment for such an offense is
five to ten years in prison. 120 There, however, is a second statute that states
when a defendant commits a second-degree offense “with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group. . . because of race, color [or] gender[,]” the
punishment for the crime can be enhanced to ten to twenty years. 121
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the defendant was charged with possessing a
firearm for an unlawful purpose. 122 He then pled guilty to the charge. 123
During the sentencing phase, the trial judge conducted a hearing and concluded
that the defendant had the “purpose to intimidate” because of race. 124
Subsequently, the trial judge, without a jury, gave the defendant more than a
ten year sentence. 125
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had the right to have the issue
decided by a jury, rather than by judge alone. 126 “Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.” 127 In coming to this determination, the Court recognized
that “due process and associated jury protections extend. . .to determinations
that [go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his
sentence.” 128
This ruling was applied to death penalty cases in Ring v. Arizona. 129 In
Ring, the jury hung in the trial phase on if Ring committed the offense of
premeditated murder, but found him guilty of felony murder. 130 In Arizona,
Ring could only be sentenced to death if further findings by the judge in the

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.
Id.
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
Id. at 484 (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 251(Scalia, J., dissenting)).
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Id. at 591.
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sentencing hearing showed that Ring was guilty of premeditated murder. 131
The judge would therefore have to determine the existence of any statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors, and ascertain that at least one aggravating
factor existed and that no mitigating factor existed that effectuated a call for
clemency. 132 After determining the existence of two aggravating factors and
no mitigating circumstance that required leniency, the trial judge sentenced
Ring to death. 133
Ring argued on appeal that by allowing a judge to find the fact that raises
the defendant’s maximum penalty, Arizona violated the Sixth Amendment’s
trial by jury guarantee. 134 The Arizona court rejected Ring’s constitutional
argument, upheld the trial court’s finding of the two aggravating factors, and
reweighed them against the mitigating factor that Ring did not have a serious
criminal record. 135 The Arizona court then affirmed the death sentence. 136
Following, Ring appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 137
The Supreme Court found Walton v. Arizona, 138 the existing precedent,
incompatible with Apprendi, and stated that the Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence could not permit both opinions to stand. 139 Subsequently, they
overruled Walton in that it no longer allows a sentencing judge, without a jury,
to find an aggravating factor necessary for the imposition of a death
sentence. 140 Additionally, because Arizona’s specified aggravating factors
operate as “the functional equivalent of a greater offense,” 141 the Sixth
Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, finds those factors. 142 In
conclusion, the Supreme Court held that the statutory aggravating factor, in the
sentencing phase, must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
rather than by a judge. 143
United States v. Booker, 144 decided in early 2005, further clarifies
Apprendi and Ring. In Booker, the jury sentenced Booker to 210 to 262

131. Id. The statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder is the death penalty, so the
judge would have to find first degree murder because the jury only convicted Ring of felony
murder which does not invoke the death penalty in Arizona. Id.
132. Id. at 592-593.
133. Id. at 594-595.
134. Id.
135. Ring, 536 U.S. at 584, 596 (2002).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 497 U.S. 639 (1990). In Walton the court ruled that a jury did not have to find the
existence of aggravating factors, the judge could. Id. at 649.
139. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
140. Id.
141. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494, n.19 (2000).
142. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
143. Id.
144. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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months in prison per the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 145 The judge, at the
sentencing hearing, instead gave Booker a thirty year sentence after finding
additional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 146
The circuit court held that the trial judge’s application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, in finding additional facts and increasing Booker’s
sentence, violated Apprendi in that it was not submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 147 Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the
Supreme Court and found that the Sixth Amendment applies to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. 148 The Court relied on Blakely v. Washington, 149
which stated that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum
he may impose without any additional findings,” in deciding that the sentence
infringed on the Sixth Amendment. 150 The Court then ordered the district
court to sentence Booker within the range supported by the jury’s findings or
to hold a separate sentencing hearing before a jury. 151
In sum, Apprendi states that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in accordance with the Sixth
Amendment. 152 Ring makes Apprendi applicable to death penalty cases, and
states that “because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the
functional equivalent of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that
they be found by a jury” beyond a reasonable doubt. 153 In addition it was
noted that:
[b]ecause most jurisdictions already mandated jury sentencing in capital cases,
Ring’s practical impact was not immediately wide-ranging. However, Ring
suggested that Apprendi’s term ‘statutory maximum’ meant the maximum
sentence that could be imposed solely on the basis of facts found by the jury—
a conclusion that turned out to be one of the cornerstones of the Blakely
Court’s analysis. 154

145. Id. at 227.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 542 U.S. 296 (2004); In addressing Washington State’s determinate sentencing scheme,
the Blakely Court found that Jones v. United States, Apprendi v. New Jersey, and Ring v. Arizona,
made clear “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a
judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant.” Id. at 303.
150. Booker, 543 U.S. at 231-232.
151. Id.
152. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
153. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.19.)
154. Barry Coburn, Making Sense of Booker and Fanfan, A.B.A., available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committee/criminal/ring.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
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B. Application of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona to
Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct
These cases are mostly applied to situations where the defendant was not
afforded a jury to determine a factor. When taking a closer look at the case
language, it is clear from Ring that not only is the defendant provided a jury,
that jury has to prove the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. 155
In U.S. v. Green, Judge Nancy Gertner, a Massachusetts U.S. District
Judge, ties Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely together with regards to unadjudicated
criminal conduct in the sentencing phase of capital trials. 156 Judge Gertner
states:
Together, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely abandoned the Court’s previous focus
on the procedural protections required when a defendant is exposed to
punishment above the statutory maximum. They emphasized the protections
that must be accorded more generally to facts, including those factors
traditionally characterized as sentencing factors, that are essential to
punishment because they increase a defendant’s punishment even within a
statutory sentencing range.
Plainly, prior unadjudicated crimes that the
government offers to justify the imposition of the ultimate punishment fit
within this category of essential factors. Although defendants urge the Court
to treat all nonstatutory aggravating factors alike and require that everything be
screened, my ruling is a narrow one, limited to prior unadjudicated crimes.
The other non-statutory factors here. . .do not raise the same constitutional
concerns as prior unadjudicated accusations of crime apparently unrelated to
the offense and uniquely prejudicial. 157

The court states in Apprendi that any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 158
Each alleged unadjudicated criminal act is a “fact.” The particular
unadjudicated criminal act, especially in states where it is used to show the
statutory aggravator of future dangerousness, undoubtedly contributes to the
increase of penalty from life without parole to the death penalty; and thus,
according to Apprendi, should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even where the evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is not used for
purposes of finding a statutory aggravator, and used simply to supplement the
State’s argument that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances, it can still be said that the evidence is used for purposes of

155. Ring, 536 U.S. at 584.
156. Judge Gertner on Ring, Apprendi, and Blakely in Capital Setting, SENTENCING LAW &
POL’Y, June 3, 2005, available at http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
2005/06/judge_gertner_o.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Judge Gertner].
157. Id.
158. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
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increasing the penalty for a crime. Furthermore, as Judge Gertner points out,
unadjudicated conduct fits within the “category of essential factors.” 159
Another case where Apprendi was applied to prior acts was State v.
Harris. 160 Here, the Oregon Supreme Court found that if a prior juvenile
adjudication is to be used for purposes of increasing the penalty for a crime,
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial necessitates that “its existence either
must be proven to a trier of fact or be admitted by a defendant for sentencing
purposes following an informed and knowing waiver.” 161 If a court can go as
far as saying that an adjudicated criminal act must be proven by a trier of fact
to be able to increase the penalty, then surely an unadjudicated act should have
to also be proven by a trier of fact.
Surprisingly, however, Oregon still allows unadjudicated conduct into the
sentencing phase of capital trials. 162 In State v. Tucker, 163 the court asserts that
the state’s statute 164 defining what evidence is allowed into the sentencing
phase of trials should be interpreted broadly and allow in evidence of
unadjudicated conduct. 165 The court’s decision in Harris does not seem to
correspond with its decision in Tucker. The Harris case was decided in 2005,
versus Tucker which was decided in 1993. 166 If the Oregon court were to
today apply Apprendi to Tucker, in the same way it applied Apprendi to
Harris, unadjudicated conduct would not be allowed in the sentencing phase of
capital trials in Oregon. Unfortunately, many states, like Oregon, have not
updated decisions regarding unadjudicated conduct in congruence with
Apprendi and Ring, and should do so to avoid incongruent decisions.
C. Conclusion
In conclusion, Apprendi clearly bans the use of facts not proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to be used in increasing the penalty of a crime. 167 An
unadjudicated criminal act is undoubtedly a “fact” for Apprendi purposes. The
only real question lies in whether or not the fact is used for purposes of
increasing the penalty. In states where a statutory aggravator of future
dangerousness exists, and the “fact” of an unadjudicated criminal act is given
as evidence in contribution to this factor, Apprendi surely applies. Arguably,
the use of an unadjudicated criminal conduct (“fact”) at any time during the
sentencing phase is for the purpose of increasing the penalty of the crime.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See Judge Gertner, supra note 156.
SC S516000 (Or. Aug. 18, 2005).
Id.
State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904 (Or. 1993).
Id.
OR. REV. STAT . § 163.150(1) (2003).
Tucker, 845 P.2d at 904.
State v. Harris, No. SC S516000 (Or. Aug. 18, 2005); Tucker, 845 P.2d at 904.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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Thus, use of an unadjudicated criminal act in the sentencing phase of a capital
trial will always violate the well established Apprendi rule.
V. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS AT SENTENCING SHOULD P ROHIBIT THE USE OF
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN THE SENTENCING P HASE OF CAPITAL
T RIALS
A. Introduction
During the early-to-mid 1900s, there was an increase in procedural
protections for criminal defendants during the pretrial phase and the trial
phase, but not for the sentencing phase. 168 Then, in Townsend v. Burke, 169 the
Supreme Court held that because of the due process clause the defendant’s
sentence should be centered on accurate information. 170 “Any hope that this
decision would lead to increased procedural protections for sentencing was
diminished in the following year, however, when the Court decided Williams v.
New York.” 171
B. Williams v. New York
In Williams v. New York, Williams was found by a jury to be guilty of
murder in the first degree. 172 The trial judge imposed a sentence of death after
the jury had recommended life in prison. 173 “In giving his reasons for
imposing the death sentence the judge discussed in open court the evidence
upon which the jury had convicted stating that this evidence had been
considered in the light of additional information obtained through the court’s
‘Probation Department, and through other sources.’” 174
New York law stated that before imposing a sentence, a court had to take
into account the defendant’s “previous criminal record, any reports of mental,
psychiatric, or physical examinations, and any other information that could aid
the court in determining the proper treatment of the defendant.” 175 During the
sentencing phase of the trial, the court discussed what it considered in
determining Williams death sentence. 176 Among other things, the court

168. Deborah Young, Fact-Finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet
the Rules, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 308 (1994).
169. 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
170. See Young, supra note 168.
171. Id. at 308.
172. 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Id.
175. See Young, supra note 168.
176. Id.
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considered information that Williams had committed thirty other burglaries,
had a “morbid sexuality,” and was a “menace to society.” 177
On appeal, Williams argued that the use of this information violated “the
right of an individual to be given reasonable notice of charges against him and
an opportunity to examine adverse witnesses, as guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 178 The Court found that, in the
past, different evidentiary rules had been employed in the sentencing phase
than in the trial phase. 179 The Court stated that the reason for the discrepancy
is that “the judge at sentencing needed a broad spectrum of information” and
that “full access to information was necessary for a judge’s selection of the
appropriate penalty because fashioning appropriate individualized,
indeterminate sentences required consideration of an offender’s past life and
habits.” 180 The Court concluded that the “Due Process Clause should not be
applied to require that evidentiary procedure at sentencing match trial
procedure.” 181
C. Application of Williams and New Cases to Unadjudicated Criminal
Conduct in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials
Since Williams v. New York, several cases have concluded that, unlike the
reasoning in Williams, the death penalty is not the same as any other
sentence. 182 Justice Stevens, in his majority opinion in Gardner v. Flori da, 183
stated that the death penalty is qualitatively different than other
punishments. 184 Likewise, in Woodson v. North Carolina, 185 the Court stated
that “there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.” 186
As noted above, the Williams Court stated that “full access to information
was necessary for a judge’s selection of the appropriate penalty because
fashioning appropriate individualized, indeterminate sentences required
consideration of an offender’s past life and habits.” 187 Unlike judges, jurors
are not “fashioning appropriate individualized. . .sentences.” 188 They are not
hearing an individual’s case, and then comparing it to other cases they have

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Williams, 337 U.S. at 244.
See Young, supra note 168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-358 (1997).
Id.
Id.
428 U.S. 280 (1976).
Id. at 305.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949).
Id.
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heard in order to fashion an appropriate sentence, like a judge would. In fact,
most jurors have probably never even heard evidence of another capital
murder. Because of the Ring decision that states that a jury, rather than a
judge, has to find a sentence of death, it can no longer be said that “a broad
spectrum of information” need be given to the sentencer. The “broad spectrum
of information,” spoken of in Williams v. New York, only applied to a judge’s
need, not a jury’s.
Additionally, Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Williams v.
Lynaugh, 189 demonstrates another approach to an argument relying on
evidentiary standards. He states:
if a defendant has a right to have a jury find that he committed a crime before
it uses evidence of that crime to sentence him to die, he has a right that the jury
that makes the determination be impartial. A jury that already has concluded
unanimously that the defendant is a first-degree murderer cannot plausibly be
expected to evaluate charges of other criminal conduct without bias and
prejudice. 190

He goes on further to state that many state courts have come to this conclusion
that the “introduction of evidence of unadjudicated offenses violates a
defendant’s due process right to an impartial jury.” 191
D. Conclusion
For many reasons, evidentiary standards should prevent evidence of
unadjudicated conduct in capital sentencing. Because a jury now must
determine the sentence in capital trials, the need for a “broad spectrum” of
information is diminished because, unlike a judge, a jury cannot “fashion an
appropriate sentence” based on its knowledge of other criminal defendants.
Additionally, a jury is prejudiced by the evidence it heard during the guilt face
of the defendant’s trial, and thus cannot listen impartially to the evidence of
unadjudicated conduct it hears in the sentencing phase of the capital trial. 192
Therefore, unadjudicated prior bad acts should not be allowed in capital
sentencing.

189.
190.
191.
192.

484 U.S. 935 (1987).
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
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VI. A LOOK AT CIVIL P ROCEDURE CASES AND THE INFLUENCE T HEY SHOULD
HAVE ON DECISIONS REGARDING UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT IN
THE SENTENCING P HASE OF CAPITAL T RIALS
A. Mathews v. Eldridge
Under the disability insurance benefits program created in the 1956
amendment to Title II of the Social Security Act, workers who are completely
disabled are provided cash benefits. 193 Eldridge was awarded benefits under
this Title in 1968, but in 1972 the state agency, after obtaining reports from his
physician and psychiatric consultant, found that his disability had
terminated. 194 Eldridge, instead of requesting reconsideration of his disability,
brought suit contesting the constitutional soundness of the administrative
procedures, created by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, for
evaluating if a continuing disability exists. 195
The Court recognized a development of considerations helpful in
determining what protections are constitutionally required under the Due
Process Clause to reduce the incidence of error on decisions affecting life,
liberty, or property. 196 The following are the three considerations that the
Mathews Court determined should be applied:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 197

B. Application of Civil Proceedings to Criminal Proceedings
Per Mathews, the tenets of due process depend on a conscientious analysis
of what is at stake. 198 To guide this analysis, the three factor test has been
implemented as a procedural safeguard in civil cases since the decision in
Mathews. The test should translate over to criminal proceedings as well.
In Mathews, the problem was that of the constitutional protection of
property. 199 With unadjudicated conduct permitted in the sentencing phase of
capital trials, the constitutional protection at issue is that of life. It seems
193. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 320, 324 (1976).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 335.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. “Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due
process of the law.” U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1.
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commonsensical that life, the most valued right that a human being has, at least
be given the same due process analysis that property 200 was given in Mathews.
If this analysis were introduced in criminal procedure, as it should be, the use
of unadjudicated evidence in the sentencing phase of capital trials would
probably be seen as a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of the individual
rights of the defendant. The third factor, that of the government’s fiscal and
administrative interest, could not possibly outweigh the risk of deprivation of
the individual rights of the defendant.
It is time that Missouri, and the rest of the nation, give criminal defendants
who are facing death the same procedural due process as it gives a man who
has lost disability payment. Therefore, unadjudicated criminal conduct should
not be allowed in the sentencing phase of capital trials because of the
procedural safeguards of due process.
VII. ARGUMENT FOR P ERMITTING EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CONDUCT
THE SENTENCING P HASE OF CAPITAL T RIALS AND REBUTTAL TO T HAT
ARGUMENT

IN

A. Opposing View: Why Proponents Want to Keep Evidence of
Unadjudicated Conduct in the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials
The main argument, inter alia, that States that continue to allow evidence
of unadjudicated conduct in capital sentencing use is that because the
defendant gets to put forth any mitigating factor in their defense, the
prosecution should get to put forth any aggravating factor in rebuttal. “[I]n all
capital cases the sentencer must be allowed to weigh the facts and
circumstances that arguably justify a death sentence against the defendant’s
mitigating evidence.” 201 In Peterson v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 202 the
Virginia Court concluded that the unadjudicated acts of the defendant were
admissible because, as the court interpreted, the Virginia statute allows for
evidence of “the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and
background of the defendant, as well as mitigating evidence.” 203
B. Rebuttal
In a study done by William J. Bowers and Wanda D. Foglia in 2003, it was
found that “45% of jurors failed to understand that they were allowed to

200. The property here is the money for the disability.
201. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 887 (2006) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982)).
202. 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983).
203. Id. at 526.
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consider any mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial.” 204
Additionally, “two-thirds of jurors failed to realize that unanimity was not
required for findings of mitigation.” 205 Also, surveys indicate that “too many
jurors misunderstand a judge’s instructions about what evidence they can
consider when weighing the death penalty.” 206 Clearly, these findings reveal
that a large percentage of jurors do not understand the importance of mitigating
factors. For this reason, the argument that a prosecutor should be allowed to
introduce evidence of unadjudicated prior bad acts because the defendant gets
to show mitigating evidence of his character is unfounded.
Not only do studies show that jurors do not give proper weight to
mitigating factors, some findings indicate that they give too much weight to
aggravators. 207 The balance of what is discussed at sentencing deliberations is
tipped definitively in the direction of aggravating factors. 208 A further study,
done by William J. Bowers, this time with colleague Ursula Bentele, indicated
the “guilt-related character of punishment deliberations.” 209 In this survey, the
authors looked at what topics are discussed during deliberations in capital
sentencing proceedings; and mitigating evidence, out of all the topics, was
discussed the least. 210 The following is a recreation of the table indicating the
results of the aforementioned study:211

204. Arbitrariness and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1328 (last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
205. Id.
206. Bill Rankin & Cameron McWhirter, Bar Association Seeks Halt to Georgia Execution,
available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/stories/0129deathpenalty.html (last visited
Jan. 20, 2007).
207. Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV.
1011, 1068 (2001).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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“TABLE 1: Percent of jurors reporting a great deal of discussion during
punishment deliberations on selected topics by type of statute.”
“Panel A. Topics Discussed Most: Guilt and Aggravation”

The defendant’s
role or
responsibility in
the crime
The way in
which the victim
was killed
How weak or
strong the
evidence was
The defendant’s
motive for the
crime
The defendant’s
planning or
premeditation
The defendant’s
dangerousness if
ever back in
society

Threshold 212
86.1

Weighing213
81.7

Directed 214
82.1

73.2

71.3

62.3

70.7

67.7

59.0

57.2

59.2

55.1

54.1

57.5

41.3

55.3

43.8

82.1

212. In this study, “Threshold” refers to states with threshold statutes. For purposes of this
study, in “threshold” states “juries are instructed that they may impose death once they find an
aggravating factor and after they consider evidence in mitigation.” See Bentele, supra note 206,
at 1014.
213. In this study, “Weighing” refers to states with weighing statutes. Id. For purposes of
this study, in “weighing” states juries “are told to weigh aggravating against mitigating
circumstances.” Id.
214. In this study, “Directed” refers to Texas, who has a directed statute. For purposes of this
study, in Texas “jurors are focused on specific factors such as the defendant’s future
dangerousness and the deliberateness or heinousness of the crime in making their penalty
decision.” Id.
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“Panel B. Topics Discussed Least: Aspects of Mitigation.”

The defendant’s
background or
upbringing
Drugs as a factor
in the crime
What moral
values require
The defendant’s
IQ or
intelligence
Alcohol as a
factor in the
crime
Mental illness as
a factor in the
crime

Threshold
20.5

Weighing
25.5

Directed
24.7

12.7

15.7

24.7

18.7

15.2

6.3

13.1

12.0

17.9

15.2

7.3

12.2

9.9

9.2

9.2

C. Conclusion
In conclusion, the argument that any evidence should be allowed into the
sentencing phase of capital trials, including unadjudicated prior bad acts, is
unsubstantiated. Not only are jurors misunderstanding the role that mitigation
plays in their sentencing deliberations, but jurors are clearly giving too much
credence to aggravating factors and not enough to mitigating factors. 215 A
defendant facing death cannot possibly be given a fair sentence if the factors
that “arguably justify a death sentence” are given more weight than the
defendant’s mitigating evidence. Therefore, the argument that unadjudicated
evidence be permitted in capital sentencing because “the sentencer must be
allowed to weigh the facts and circumstances that arguably justify a death
sentence against the defendant’s mitigating evidence,” 216 is not so influential
as to keep Missouri and other similar states from banning such evidence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
“revenge n. 1. punishment or injury inflicted in return for what one has
suffered; desire to inflict this; the act of retaliation.
215. Id.
216. Brown v. Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884, 887 (2006) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982)).
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justice n. 1. justness, fairness; the exercise of authority in the maintenance
of right.” 217
It is time to take a close look at the real purpose behind allowing
unadjudicated evidence into the sentencing phase of capital trials. Is it to seek
“revenge,” or is the prosecution in search of “justice”? As stated, supra,
revenge is defined as “punishment or injury inflicted in return for what one has
suffered; desire to inflict this; the act of retaliation.” 218 Justice is defined as
“justness, fairness; the exercise of authority in the maintenance of right.” 219
Did Gray, see supra, die at the hands of the state of Virginia because the
prosecution was exercising it’s authority in the maintenance of right, or did he
die because the prosecution was retaliating against the death of McClelland?
Arguably, Gray’s death was a result of the latter. The prosecution was
retaliating against McClelland’s death by using evidence of a crime that Gray
had not, prior to his trial, been a suspect. This blatant disregard for fairness
makes Gray’s execution vengeful, not just.
The prosecutor “is the representative . . . of a sovereignty . . . whose
interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.” 220 Even in the 1930’s, when this statement was declared
in Berger v. U.S., there was an understanding that the prosecution’s goal was
not to win at all cost. The prosecution is not pitted against the defendant, with
the only goal being to win for their client, as in a civil proceeding. The only
purpose for the Sorrell murders to be interjected would be to enable the
prosecution to win, not to serve justice. 221 The Sorrell murders should not
have entered the sentencing phase because the requirement “in safeguarding
the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through the action of the state
embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions.” 222
It will never be known how the jury would have sentenced Gray without
the evidence of the Sorell murders introduced in the sentencing phase of
Gray’s trial. At the very least, the jurors would have been less likely to
sentence Gray to death if they had not heard the evidence. And even if only
one juror were to find Gray not eligible for the death penalty without the
Sorrell murders, Gray’s life would have been saved.
The purpose of abandoning the precedent permitting unadjudicated
criminal conduct into the sentencing phase of capital trials is to avoid
outcomes like in Gray, and avoid a person dying at the hands of the
217. T HE OXFORD REFERENCE DICTIONARY 448, 705 (Joyce M. Hawkins ed., 1986).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 448.
220. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
221. Not only for Gray, but for the Sorrells who undoubtedly would not have wanted another
human being unrelated to their deaths, die as a result of them.
222. Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316-317 (1926).
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government for the wrong reasons. 223 This argument in itself should be
enough for Missouri to forbid evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct that
has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in the sentencing phase of
capital trials. When taken together with domestic and international opinions,
the rules in Apprendi and Ring, evidentiary standards at sentencing, the
applicable civil procedure test in Mathews, and the deficient role of mitigating
factors versus aggravating factors, evidence of unadjudicated conduct should
not be permitted in capital sentencing in the name of “justness, fairness, and
the exercise of authority in the maintenance of right.” 224
ANNE-MARIE
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223. Assuming that there are right reasons for a person to be executed by the hands of the
government.
224. T HE OXFORD REFERENCE DICTIONARY 448 (Joyce M. Hawkins ed., 1986).
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